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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REID D. BENCH and 







Case No. 13929 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
COME NOW plaintiffs and appellants, Reid D. Bench 
and Alta M. Bench, and pursuant to Rule 76-E of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure petition this honorable Court for a re-hear-
ing. This Petition is based upon the following points of error 
as supported by the attached brief of authorities: 
POINT I. 
This Court has committed error by finding a scrivener's 
error when there was no scrivener's error, by finding a mutual 
mistake of fact when there was no mutual mistake of fact, and 
by judicially repealing Sec. 57-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
POINT II. 
The majority opinion has committed error by holding 
that the record supports a finding that the option expired be-
fore it was properly exercised. 
POINT III. 
The majority opinion has committed error in not recog-
nizing that the statute of limitations and latches preclude def-
endant from asserting the defense of mutual mistake. 
IUWLL\08 ,KOBKRT8 & BjLACK 
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POINT IV. 
The majority opinion has failed to recognize the fact 
that even if the agreement is reformed so that it pertains solely 
to surface rights, the plaintiffs would still have the right pur-
suant to said agreement to exercise the option to purchase such 
rights pursuant to the reformed agreement. •
 t 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *f day of / /< r^cs j 7, ' 
19 75. 
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK 
A y 
BY: ^ '^4%%* s^* 
WAYNE Z. BLACK 400 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants. 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Petition 
for Re-Hearing-to John Boyden, attorney for defendant, 1000 
Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133, on the 4th day 
of August, 19 75. ^ V / 
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STATE OF UTAH 
R E I D D. B E N C H and 
A L T A M. B E N C H , his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
E R M A PACE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
P E T I T I O N FOR R E H E A R I N G 
A N D B R I E F I N S U P P O R T T H E R E O F 
P R E L I M I N A R Y S T A T E M E N T 
The majority opinion is based upon a series of 
misconceptions as to the issues and facts of this case. 
If allowed to stand it will create an unrest in the law 
and will bring down upon the bench and bar an avalanche 
of unnecessary litigation. Utah will stand alone as the 
one state in which titles to real estate can be contested 
without significant restraint by claims of oral under-
standings going back for any number of years. Relatives 
will be allowed to flood the courts claiming that some 
dear old aunt was bilked out of subsurface rights when 
Case No. 
13929 
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2 
she sold the family farm because a fee simple conveyance 
is not a fee simple conveyance in Utah. The shocking 
result arrived at by the majority of this Court, in all 
candor, should be reviewed, not necessarily to prevent 
an injustice to the Plaintiffs but to prevent an injustice 
to the citizens of this state. 
P O I N T I 
T H I S COURT H A S C O M M I T T E D E R R O R 
BY F I N D I N G A S C R I V E N E R ' S E R R O R 
W H E N T H E R E W A S NO S C R I V E N E R ' S 
ERROR, BY F I N D I N G A M U T U A L M I S T A K E 
O F F A C T W H E N T H E R E W A S NO M U T U A L 
M I S T A K E O F FACT, A N D BY J U D I C I A L L Y 
R E P E A L I N G SECTION 57-1-3 U T A H CODE 
A N N O T A T E D , 1953. 
Plaintiffs presented as one of their most funda-
mental contentions on appeal the proposition that the 
trial court had overlooked and failed to consider the 
clear language of Section 57-1-3. We feel we are en-
titled to have that point considered by this Court. Yet 
said section is not once alluded to in the majority opin-
ion. Section 57-1-3 states: 
"A fee simple title is presumed to be intended 
to pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless 
it appears from the conveyance that a lesser 
estate was intended." 
What do the words "from the conveyance" mean? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3 
Is this Court to emasculate from the statute the un-
mistakable meaning of those words by simply ignoring 
the problem? 
Let's take the logic of our position from the top. 
A sells real estate to B and delivers a fee simple con-
veyance. Later B claims that fee simple doesn't mean 
fee simple at all because the parties orally understood 
that subsurface rights were to be retained. B answers 
that Section 57-1-3 resolves the problem because if the 
parties intended a reservation of subsurface rights said 
intent must appear "from the conveyance." This Court 
doesn't even give a nodding acquaintance to Section 
57-1-3 as a matter of importance in this case. 
This Court has based its unusual opinion on the 
proposition that a mutual mistake of fact resulted from 
a scrivener's error. This is an unsupportable proposi-
tion. The scrivener wasn't even called to testify. No 
claim was made by Defendant either in her pleadings 
or in her testimony that the scrivener had made an 
error. She testified that she hadn't even talked to the 
scrivener. The witnesses all testified that the parties 
read the agreement at Mrs. Pace's home in the presence 
of each other before it was signed. Mrs. Pace's son, 
who was also a party to the agreement, wasn't called to 
testify. But Mrs. Pace admitted that he also read and 
signed the instrument without making any objection 
whatsoever. No effort was made by Mrs. Pace either 
then or down through the years to reform the language 
of the agreement. Mrs. Pace testified, "I was aware 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that it should have been in there before I ever signed it." 
We put it to this Court as a hard and stubborn fact 
that this is not a scrivener's error case. Yet, the majority 
opinion states ". . . I t appears the omission was an over-
sight on the part of scrivener and the parties to the 
contract . . . " Aren't the Plaintiffs entitled to a re-
evaluation of this proposition? If there was no scrive-
ner's error unobserved by the parties to the agreement, 
Section 57-1-3 is controlling, and plaintiffs are entitled 
to prevail. 
The majority opinion cites as a case that dealt 
with "an identical problem" the case of Sine v. Harper, 
118 U. 415, 222 P.2d 571. The Sine case is not in point. 
The mutual mistake in the Sine case was buried in a 
legal description and had to do with the dimensions and 
bounds of the property involved. This Court held that 
both parties were unaware until long after the agree-
ment that these legal descriptions did not coincide with 
the original agreement of the parties. The Sine case 
is a bona fide scrivener's error case. In the case at bar 
the parties would have had to be unaware of the omis-
sion to reserve oil and gas rights in the document and 
not negligent in their unawareness in order for the Sine 
case to be good authority. Here we have a complete 
awareness on the part of Mrs. Pace of the absent reser-
vation. Here we are dealing with a conveyance in which 
there were no reservations of interest on the part of the 
seller and where Section 57-1-3 of the Utah Code de-
clares as a matter of law that under such circumstances 
a fee simple estate has been conveyed. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Furthermore, the Sine case is not the only Utah 
case in which awareness or lack of awareness of a claimed 
scrivener's error has been held to be of important sig-
nificance in an action to reform a written instrument 
on the ground of mutual mistake. Listen again to the 
language of Intermountain Farmers Assn. v. Peart, 
30 U.2d 201, 515 P.2d 614 (1973), a classic scrivener's 
error case. 
"Through a mistake of its scrivener the war-
ranty deed executed by the plaintiff to the 
defendants described the entire five acres. 
When the mistake was discovered, plaintiff 
requested the defendants to reconvey the excess 
acreage." 
See also Crabb v. Chisum, 183 Okl. 138, 80 P.2d 653 
originally cited by counsel for defendant. 
The Peart case is like the Sine case. They both 
involved undiscovered scrivener's errors. Here there 
was no scrivener's error let alone an undiscovered scrive-
ner's error. The failure of the agreement to contain a 
reservation of oil and gas rights was known to both 
parties from the first. Section 57-1-3 defines the nature 
of the estate conveyed. If a lesser estate was intended 
by the parties this fact by statute must appear "from 
the conveyance." On behalf of our client we ask this 
Court to re-examine the testimony in the light of Mr. 
Justice Ellett's dissent where he states the point so 
clearly. "I agree with the statement in the main opinion 
about reformation in cases of Mutual Mistake of Fact. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
However, in this case there was no mutual mistake of 
fact. The defendant herself did not even have a mistake 
of fact." 
Plaintiffs made the point that Defendant was 
barred by the Statute of Limitations and Laches from 
asserting any subsurface rights. The unchallenged facts 
that the agreement was signed on September 8, 1965, 
the extension agreement signed on May 22, 1967, the 
option exercised on January 8, 1971 by payment of the 
$2,000.00, and that the very first claim of subsurface 
rights on behalf of Mrs. Pace was not made until the 
Beaslin letter to Bench dated April 5, 1971, seem not 
to have been considered by the majority opinion at all. 
Can it be that Mrs. Pace, with full knowledge that 
there was no reservation of subsurface rights in the 
agreement, from the date of signing on September 8, 
1965, could sleep on her rights for over five and one-
half years before asserting her claim, in the very face 
of the Utah three-year Statute of Limitations, and be 
allowed by this Court to get away with this flagrant 
violation of statutory law? We believe for this reason 
alone that our Petition for Rehearing should be granted. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N H A S COM-
M I T T E D E R R O R BY H O L D I N G T H A T T H E 
R E C O R D S U P P O R T S A F I N D I N G T H A T 
T H E O P T I O N E X P I R E D B E F O R E I T W A S 
P R O P E R L Y E X E R C I S E D . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The majority of the Court has committed error 
in supporting Defendant's claim that Plaintiffs' right 
to exercise the option had terminated. I t must be noted 
once more that this lawsuit was filed on November 30, 
1972, and that the option period would not have ex-
pired until September 8, 1973. The very purpose of 
this suit was to enforce Plaintiffs' right to exercise the 
option, and the suit was filed within the option period. 
I t is interesting to note that this Court hasn't con-
sidered the fact that even if the agreement applied only 
to surface rights the Plaintiffs would still be entitled 
to exercise the option to purchase if such was their 
desire. 
I t is a well established rule of law that: 
$ • • • ' 
"The rights and liabilities of the parties—that 
is their rights to an action or to judgment or 
relief—depend upon the facts as they existed 
at the time of the commencement of the action, 
and not at the time of trial." 1 AmJur 2d. 
Actions §87 P.616. 
That this principle applies equally to defenses is also 
clear. See, i.e., 1 CJS Actions § 125 P . 1389. 
In the case of Elizabeth B. Archer v. Utah State 
Land Board, et d., 392 P.2d 622, 15 U.2d 321 (1964), 
this Court was faced with a situation where during the 
interim between the filing of the original and amended 
complaint the 1963 session of the Utah State Legisla-
ture passed an amendment which Defendant claimed 
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divested the District Court of jurisdiction of the matter 
in controversy. In holding that the District Court did 
indeed have jurisdiction, this Court said: 
"This question can best be resolved by re-
marking that ordinarily the facts and the law 
in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of the 
date of the filing of the original complaint. 
We see no good reason for departing from 
that basic rule in this case." 
Likewise, in the case at bar, there is ". . . no good 
reason for departing from that basic rule . . ." The fact 
that the option period ended during the pendency of 
this action is of no relevancy whatsoever in the determi-
mation of the right of Plaintiffs to exercise their option. 
CONCLUSION 
We earnestly submit that a rehearing should be 
granted and the determination that there was a scrive-
ner's error reconsidered before it is allowed to do ir-
reparable damage to the title law of Utah. The doing 
of justice in this case demands a return to the simple 
logic of Jensen v. Rice, 7 U.2d 276, 322 P.2d 259, 
where this Court said : 
"As to the contentions that defendant did not 
contract as alleged or that he executed a dif-
ferent contract, both are refuted by, and are 
inconsistent with defendant's signature on the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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contract and his admitted knowledge of its 
terms." 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK 
By 
Wayne L. Black 
Suite 400, Ten Broadway Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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